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Abstract 
We first set out the rationale for the emerging policy of the Competitive Selection Process 
(CSP) which mandates market testing the Power Supply Agreements (PSA) of Distribution Utilities in 
the Philippines. It will potentially address several possible market failures such as connected dealings 
(“sweetheart deals,” in common parlance) with proprietary GENCOS, lack of incentives for DUs to 
procure at lowest cost, abuse of market power by large GENCOS in certain localities, etc. It will also 
potentially lighten the regulatory load of the Energy Regulatory Council (ERC) by replacing the 
burdensome and politically-sensitive accounting method of evaluating PSAs. It may also attract 
additional generation capacities by new players. Lower generation cost―and finally, lower prices for 
consumers―is also a possibility, but not guaranteed. We then discuss the evolution of the design of 
the CSP over the last two years and how the simplest and best modality was finally arrived at.    
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Part 1 
Introduction: Need and Rationale 
 
The market testing of power supply agreements―labelled the Competitive Selection Process 
(CSP)―was first proposed for all Distribution Utilities (DUs) in 2013 in an Energy Regulatory Council 
(ERC) resolution mandating it for DUs’ Power Supply Agreements (PSA). This resolution, however, 
remained unsigned and likely sidelined in deference to the initiatives along similar lines pursued by 
the Department of Energy (DOE). CSP was the subject of DOE Circular No. DC2015-06-0008 (DC 06-
0008 from hereon) signed 11 June 2015 entitled: “Mandating All Distribution Utilities to Undergo 
Competitive Selection Process (CSP) in Securing PSA.” This Circular was eventually superseded by Joint 
Resolution 1 promulgated by both the ERC and the DOE on 20 October 2015.  
PSAs are contracts for the delivery of power by GENCOS to DUs specifying the quantity, price, 
delivery dates and other terms, many of them contingent on other events, such as the exchange rate 
movement. The PSAs of a DU with one or several GENCOS generate the generation cost of the DU 
which is submitted and subject to approval by the regulatory office, the ERC. If approved by the ERC, 
the generation cost is passed on to consumers of the said DU. Generation cost constitutes an average 
of 48% of the total charge per kilowatt to the consumer. An example of the power purchase profile 
and generation cost breakdown is that of Manila Electric Company (Meralco) for April 2015 (Figure 
1). 
 
The principal features of the DC 06-0008 were: 
 
1. All PSA contracts covering uncontracted demand must be subject to Auction.  
2. The mandatory aggregation and auction of un-contracted demand of small DUs. 
3. Mandatory Participation of DUs in the auction program but optional participation for 
GENCOS. 
4. One PSA contract template for the auctions; and one transactions manager.  
The Enabling Law: EPIRA (2001) 
The enabling law supporting the DOE DC2015-06-0008 is EPIRA (2001). EPIRA (Electric Power 
Industry Reform Act of 2001) was the state response to numerous problems confronting the state-
dominated power sector. One of these problems was the fiscal drain attributed to the state-owned 
and operated GENCOS and state-owned Transmission Grid. The fiscal drain in turn was due in large 
part to take-or-pay contracts with independent power producers (IPP) which feature was outlawed 
under EPIRA and high power prices. For example, NPC debt was 28% of GDP in 2003. EPIRA sought to 
completely open the power sector to market players, e.g., privatization of NPC assets, retail 
competition (RCOA), and spot market for power (Wholesale Electricity Spot Market). The power 
industry structure envisioned in EPIRA is “partially unbundled”: generation, distribution, and 
transmission were unbundled with the exception that GENCOS are allowed to procure up to 50% of 
their power demand from affiliated/proprietary GENCOS. EPIRA considers power distribution and 
power transmission as regulated activities but generation as competitive. Distribution utilities will be 
regulated as long as it has captive consumers, meaning, that retail competition remains incomplete. 
Figure 2 gives the power industry structure consequent to EPIRA. 
Figure 1: Power Purchase profile of Meralco for March 2015 
 
COMPUTATION OF THE GENERATION CHARGE FOR MARCH 2015a
(Applicable for Customers Not Under Meralco TOU)
Based on February 2015 Generation Costs
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E = C + D) (F = E/A) (G) (H = F - G)
Basic Other Total Average Average
GWH Energy Generation Cost Gen Cost Gen Cost Gen Cost
Source (million kWh) Share Cost Adjustmentsb for the Month (Feb 2015) (Jan 2015) Incr/(Decr)
Purchased) (%) (PhP million) (PhP million) (PhP million) (PhP/kWh) (PhP/kWh) (PhP/kWh)
A. Power Supply Agreements (PSAs) Dispatchc
1. SEM-Calaca Power Corp. (SCPC) 99.6% 185.29 8.0% 592.58 1.17 593.75 3.2044 3.4770 (0.2726)
2. Masinloc Power Partners Corp. (MPPC) 97.5% 166.90 7.2% 780.65 (0.79) 779.86 4.6726 4.8394 (0.1668)
3. Therma Luzon Inc. (TLI) 78.6% 146.15 6.3% 550.60 1.10 551.71 3.7750 4.1332 (0.3582)
4. San Miguel Energy Corp. (SMEC) 83.3% 204.40 8.8% 842.78 2.58 835.35 4.0869 4.6222 (0.5353)
5. South Premiere Power Corp. (SPPC) 65.7% 520.37 22.4% 2,262.88 4.31 2,267.19 4.3569 4.5528 (0.1959)
6. Therma Mobile Inc. (TMO) 20.6% 30.67 1.3% 295.53 (0.15) 295.38 9.6295 15.4217 (5.7922)
Subtotal 72.5% 1,253.78 53.9% 5,315.03 8.21 5,323.24 4.2457 4.5442 (0.2985)
B. Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs/IPPs)
1. Quezon Power Phils Ltd. Co. (QPPL)d (2.06) -0.1% 638.54 7.91 646.45 6.5590
2. First Gas Power Corp. (FGPC) - Sta. Rita 83.9% 644.80 27.7% 3,013.44 19.77 3,033.22 4.7041 5.0470 (0.3429)
3. FGP Corporation (FGP) - San Lorenzo 73.5% 298.85 12.9% 1,447.66 7.57 1,455.23 4.8695 4.9960 (0.1265)
Subtotal 62.1% 941.59 40.5% 5,099.64 35.25 5,134.89 5.4535 5.2780 0.1755
C. Wholesale Electricity Spot Market (WESM) 103.94 4.5% 726.27 307.78 1,034.04 9.9488 8.8106 1.1382
D. Otherse 24.81 1.1% 248.27 (0.01) 248.26 10.0060 9.0297 0.9763
Total Generation Cost for Captive 2,324.12 100.0% 11,389.21 351.22 11,740.43 5.0516 5.0677 (0.0161)
Generation Rate Adjustments
Pilferage Recovery (0.0135)f (0.0154) 0.0019
Compensation for Deloaded kWhs of ILP Participantsg 0.0000 0.0004 (0.0004)
High Load Factor Rider 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005
TOU Differentialh 0.0130 0.0139 (0.0009)
NPC Gram 0.1578 0.1715 (0.0137)
5.2097 5.2384 (0.0287)
billing month Mar 2015 Feb 2015
Notes:
a Based on February 2015 month's  prel iminary bi l l s  of PSAs  and Wholesa le Electrici ty Spot Market (WESM), and fina l  bi l l s  for the rest of the suppl iers
b Perta ins  to Forex Di fferentia ls  for PSAs  (TLI, SMEC, and SPPC) and IPPs  (QPPL, Sta . Ri ta , San Lorenzo) and previous  months ' adjustments  for WESM, SCPC, MMPC, Therma Mobi le and 1590 Energy Corp.
c The dispatch figures  shown are a) the load factors  of the PSA plants  in relation to their actual  supply for the month and, b) the plant capaci ty factors  (PCF) of the IPPs
d
 Under scheduled mainta inance for the whole supply period
e Includes  Renewable Energy (Phi lpodeco, Bacavel ley Energy Inc., Pangea Green Energy Phi l ippines  and export energy from Net Metering customers) and 1590 Energy corp.
f Represents  the amount of PhP31.3 mi l l ion pi l ferage recovery returned by Meralco to i ts  customers
g In accordance with ERC Order dated Apri l  11, 2014 on Meralco's  Interruptible Load Program (ILP) implementation
h
 Ca lculated based on the formula  approved by the ERC in i ts  decis ion under ERC Case No. 2012-117 RC
Generation Charge for Billing
Figure 2: Power Industry Profile Post EPIRA and Classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ERC 
 
The following EPIRA provision (Section 2.c) shows that the CSP conforms with the spirit of the 
Act:  
Sec 2c: “To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free 
and fair competition and full public accountability to achieve greater 
operational and economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of 
Philippine products in the global market.” 
The main purpose of the CSP is to mandate market competition in power procurement of DUs 
as long as these have captive consumers. CSP may be viewed as an interim policy while the roll-out 
of RCOA remains incomplete. To date, that is by February 2016, retail competition has been limited 
to 750-megawatt consumers. In other jurisdictions where all consumers have become contestable 
(complete RCOA) as in New Zealand, CSP of PSAs has ceased. This is because it is understood that full 
retail competition will force DUs to procure from lowest cost supplier or lose contestable retail 
customers. To date, the Meralco franchise has lost about one gigawatt of its captured market to 
contestable status.  
Power Prices in the Philippines 
The Philippines’ electricity prices have now become the highest in Asia apart from Japan. 
Figure 3 gives the residential rates across the region (2011). 
 Source: JICA-IEEJ (2013) 
  
Power Price Trajectory in the EPIRA Era 
Despite EPIRA―and some will say because of it―the price of power in the Philippines 
continues to rise.  
 
 
 
 
Source: EPIRA Implementation Reports, DOE [2007 is an estimate] 
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Figure 4: Trajectory of the Post-EPIRA Price of Power: Luzon and National 
Figure 5: Philippine Share in DFI to the ASEAN  
 
Needless to say, this high power cost erodes the competitiveness of power-intensive 
tradeable sectors, especially of Manufacturing; reduces the capacity of the country to attract foreign 
investment, especially in the traded goods sector; and discourages investment in general.  
The Philippines has the lowest investment rate in the region (21%) and the lowest share in 
DFI in the region. Figure 5 gives the share of the Philippines (dark red) in the net DFI into the ASEAN. 
 
Source of original data: UNCTAD  
The twin goals of poverty reduction and employment creation of the government are jeopardized. 
The CSP is envisioned to result in a more market-determined and transparent generation cost of 
power and reduced administrative burden for the regulators. 
 
Possible Reasons for High Power Cost 
Apart from the archipelagic geography which clearly contributes to higher cost, there are 
many other possible reasons for the high cost of electricity in the Philippines. 
1. Taxes and Subsidies 
The role of “Taxes and Subsidies” in the high power cost is a debated issue. R. del Mundo 
(2014) claims that based on USAID 2013 data, taking out the taxes and subsidies from power 
tariffs in the Philippines does not change the position of the country in the comparative tariff 
table. Figure 6 reproduces his figure. 
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Figure 6: Comparative Tariff Rates by Country with Philippine Taxes and Subsidies Removed 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: USAID (2013) cited in Rowaldo del Mundo (2014) 
 
Others claim that subsidies, especially in Indonesia, are crucial.  
2. Low Generation Capacity per Capita  
The Philippines has the lowest per capita generation capacity at 725kwh, which is only a 
third of Thailand’s at 2328 kwh (Table 1).    
 
Table 1: Per Capita Generation Capacity in 5 + 3 
 
 
Country Per Capita Net Generation Capacity in kWh 
(2012) 
Philippines 725.60 
Thailand 2,328.27 
Indonesia 747.20 
Malaysia 4,369.63 
Vietnam 1,307.92 
China 3,518.05 
Japan 7,601.28 
Korea 10,072.32 
PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE INDONESIA MALAYSIA THAILAND
Residential 0.361 0.252 0.116 0.130 0.248
Commercial 0.373 0.252 0.245 0.235 0.287
LV Industrial 0.302 0.243 0.200 0.208 0.277
HV Industrial 0.300 0.218 0.177 0.189 0.256
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PH is 40% higher 
Figure 6: Power Mix in the Philippines in 2014 
 
 
3. Very Low Power Reserves due to the Dearth of New Greenfield Investment in the EPIRA Era  
4. Fuel Mix  
Figure 7 below shows the distribution of power source by fuel. Coal-based 
power―constituting 34.40% of total in 2014―is the cheapest, so an increase in the share of coal-
based power, say to 50%, will favorably impact the generation cost considerably. This path is 
limited due to the existence of long-term bilateral contracts involving higher cost fuels such as 
natural gas binding on DUs, say, on Meralco. 
 
 
 
 
Source: DOE 
 
 
One cannot fail to note that the share of renewable energy in the Philippine energy mix 
was at 30.65% in 2014. This is so much higher than renewable shares in the Asian region and in 
the world. The Philippine power sector is one of the most renewables-intensive in the world. This 
should form an important point of departure for the choice of energy mix and planning for the 
future. The Philippines is a victim of global warming for which other countries, not the Philippines, 
are responsible. 
Coal
34.40%
Natural Gas
17.66%
Geothermal
10.28%
Biomass
0.52%
Baseload Hydro
4.06%
Hydro
15.02%
Oil-based
17.30%
Wind
0.6…
Solar
0.11%
Box 1: The Redondo Power Project 
 
5. Cost of Financing, Stranded Asset, FIT and Universal and Missionary Activities charged to power 
consumers instead of the Philippine treasury. 
6. Government Failures 
Red tape, licensing requirements, local-national impasses leading to long delays and the 
dearth of investment in greenfield plants. Box 1 of long delay due to local hurdles is the case of 
the Redondo Coal Power Project in Subic which has been delayed despite having previously 
passed all the national legal and environmental requirements.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Market Power  
It is often claimed that big private market players may be abusing market power in their 
respective area grids. GENCOS and their market shares in the Philippines and in various regions 
are given in Figure 7. In Luzon, four generation companies account for 79% of total power supply 
(San Miguel Power, Aboitiz Power, First Gas, and PSALM [government owned]). In the entire 
Philippines, these four entities account for 72% of total. In Mindanao, NPC, Psalm, and Aboitiz 
account for 97% of total, but Aboitiz Power, the largest private power supplier, accounts for only 
18%. The rest is by government entities NPC and PSALM. This does not give less a picture of 
potential market power and its abuse by private players but more of the mismanagement by 
government of its own generation assets. Market failures may be attributed to other factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Redondo Power Project is a 600-MW Circulating Fluidized coal-fired plant in Subic, owned by RP Energy, 
a Meralco-led consortium with Aboitiz and Taiwan Cogeneration. It commenced in 2010 but was delayed 
due to legal challenges by environmental groups and a writ of kalikasan issued by the Supreme Court in 2012. 
Construction resumed only in mid-2015 after the Supreme Court on 3 February 2015 junked the petition to 
terminate the project. The plant should have come on stream in 2015 to ease the projected power crisis in 
that year. Now, it looks like it will have to wait for 2019 to be fully operational. 
Figure 7: GENCOS and Market Shares in the Philippines and in Various Regions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DOE 
8. Market Failures 
Market failures, as everyone now knows, are the necessary conditions for socially-
beneficial government interventions. Government interventions may solve market failures but 
may also end up as government failures if (a) there is no market failure to start with, and (b) 
given a true market failure, the government intervention turns out to be wrong, inadequate or 
badly-designed or implemented. This latter state of affairs is endemic in so-called “weak states”: 
states that do not have the autonomy to make rules and/or do not have the capacity to properly 
enforce the rules or implement its programs. The likelihood that government by its interventions 
ends up reducing social welfare rather than improving it is very high in weak states. 
The Possible Market Failures in PSA:  
 Possible Abuse of Market Power: GENCOS may just dictate the terms of the PSA on small 
fragmented DUs and ECs. 
 DUs do not have the incentive to procure power from lowest cost supplier since generation 
cost is a pass-on cost to captive consumers.  
 Possible transfer pricing with proprietary/affiliated GENCOS: As pointed out earlier, (1) EPIRA 
allows DUs to procure up to 50% of power purchases from proprietary or affiliated/imbedded 
GENCOS and (2) generation is considered a competitive activity, so profits of generation 
companies are not capped, while distribution is considered a regulated activity where profits 
are subject to rate of return ceiling. Transfer pricing can be attractive. 
 Coordination failure: Small, fragmented DUs and ECs are unable, on their own, to aggregate 
their demands into bid-attractive volumes and auction them, even if they are willing to do so.   
 Possible collusion between GENCOS and DUs: since DUs are not incentivized to procure at 
lowest cost, they could collude with GENCOS to gouge the captive customers of DUs. 
The DC 06-0008 aimed to remedy these possible market failures through the following: (a) 
the mandated auctioning of the power purchases (PSAs) of DUs will bring these contracts into open 
competition; (b) the aggregation of the power demands of DUs and Electric Cooperatives (ECs), which 
are each too small to attract bidders, will now attract consolidators/generators. Since generation 
charges are pass-on costs to captive consumers (though subject to approval by the ERC), there is little 
incentive on the part of DUs and ECs to resist collusive proposal from GENCOS to gouge the captive 
consumers. If, however, the separate power demands of many DU and ECs are aggregated, they can 
form interesting volumes which could attract interested power suppliers, whether extant or 
prospective. (c) The third feature: auctioning of a large enough volume, may even attract new 
greenfield power units which add to the overall generation capacity of the grid/region. The cases of 
Amreco in Mindanao and Clefcaf in Luzon, both privately-implemented (more on these initiatives 
below), where the uncontracted demands of several small DUs were aggregated and successfully put 
up for bids with the help of NGOs, illustrate this. The winner in each case promised to put up new 
plants. The DC 06-0008 was intended to scale up the reputed successes of these two private 
initiatives. The claimed discount on the price of the power supply agreements form these two 
initiatives must be viewed with a grain of salt since these promised plants will be coal-fired.   
Alternative Regulatory Remedies to Possible Market Failures in PSA 
1. Current Method: The Accounting Method  
The ERC is the legally-mandated body for the regulation of regulated power activities. It 
approves petitions for tariff adjustment from DUs and the NGCP, the transmission grid 
concessionaire. In the process, it also ensures that the services rendered are compliant with its 
standards. To do this, (1) it uses the Accounting Method: its personnel evaluate petitions based 
on―and verify the veracity of―submitted supporting documents (with Possible Price 
Comparison) on, among others, the PSA contracts; (2) it conducts public hearings to elicit 
stakeholder scrutiny of the petition before promulgating its decisions. In all these, it faces the 
difficulty of discovering “fair and prudent prices.” This process is intensive in scarce time and 
talent resources--enough of which ERC may not have because of pay and hiring hurdles. 
Furthermore, the accounting method is always suspected by captive consumers of bias in favor 
of the DUs―a charge coming under the rubric of a popular narrative, regulatory capture, which 
partly arises from perceived moral hazard―the lack of incentives on the part of ERC examiners 
to be thorough, and the presumed capacity of large DUs to lobby for favorable rulings. Whatever 
their decision and however they uphold the balanced view, they run the risk of being publicly 
pilloried either as pawns of the moneyed DU lobbies or as pawns of populist lobbies. Thus, 
considerable regulatory delays are the normal state of affairs. It must be noted that the ERC 
already requires competitive selection or bidding for CAPEX reimbursement petition which 
reduces the required regulatory burden. In developed urban jurisdictions, organized consumer 
lobbies and an active press apply constant pressure on regulators and DUs towards lower tariffs. 
This may indeed lead to lower tariffs (Fabella, 1998). This is not true in many areas.  
 
2. CSP as Alternative Regulatory Remedy 
The market testing of PSA Contracts poses an alternative to the current accounting 
method to deter possible abuse of market power and other shenanigans. It has very attractive 
features: 
 It is easier to enforce in theory: the ERC only verifies and approves (perhaps with the help of 
outside experts) the market test procedure (say, auction--of which there are numerous types) 
employed. When reassured and satisfied, it takes the auction outcome as “fair and prudent” 
and can do away with the tedious accounting method.  
 It is so much easier to defend in public and avoids the moral hazard-related charge of bias and 
regulatory capture. 
 When ERC is not satisfied with the private CSP, it can subject the PSA to a Swiss Challenge as 
part, or as extension, of the customary public hearing with stakeholders it normally conducts 
for the purpose. A Swiss challenge is a process by which the specification/provisions of an 
unsolicited bid or a negotiated contract for a project is made public and third parties are 
invited to tender a bid lower than the price in the negotiated contract; if no  bid is tendered, 
the original proponent gets the contract. If a lower bid is tendered, the original proponent is 
aske to match the price; if the original proponent fails to match the contract goes to the the 
party with the lower bid. Thus a Swiss challenge is a form of a market test for the contract. 
The Local Templates of CSP 
The impetus for the government CSP initiative were two private local templates: the Amreco 
in Mindanao and the Clefcaf in Central Luzon. Both involved the aggregation of small DU and EC 
power demands and the auction of the aggregated volumes. Both were initiated by the private sector 
and NGO wherein Dr. Rowaldo del Mundo played a prominent role. The following table (Table 2) 
details some prominent facts about these initiatives.  
 
MINDANAO CENTRAL LUZON 
  Association of Mindanao Rural Electric 
Cooperatives Power Supply Aggregation 
Group Corp. (AMRECO-PSAG) – 20 ECs 
auctioned a total of 330 MW baseload 
    Signed long-term power supply contract at 
Php 4.12/kWh 
  GenCo required to supply new power 
generation capacity in 2017 
 Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives 
Association First Luzon Aggregation Group 
(CLECAFLAG) – 12 ECs auctioned a total of 
300 MW uncontracted demand 
    Signed long-term power supply contract at 
Php 3.70/kWh 
  GenCo required to supply new power 
generation capacity in 2018 
Note: (1) The PSA in these two cases are coal-
based. Is the gain due to competition or fuel 
mix? 
(2) Capacity Building: The initiatives have 
engendered new generation capacity. 
 
It is claimed that the two initiatives realized substantial discount in the contract supply price. 
The power contracted for delivery is, however, coal-based--the lowest cost power generation. Since 
Meralco procurement of coal-based power is on or below the PHP 3.50/kwh (see Power Purchase 
Profile above), the question remains whether the discount is fuel mix-based or auction-based. The 
Table 2. Experience in the Philippines: Private Initiative 
undeniable fact is that the auction promised new baseload power capacity which will raise the total 
generation capacity and enlarge the power generation of the Philippines. Likewise, this widens the 
options of these small DUs for power supplies which can only help reduce power cost. 
Potential Outcomes 
  Will CSP directly lower the cost of power in the Philippines? There is no guarantee of that. 
Will CSP crowd in new generation capacity? That is a real possibility and may help address capacity 
building and indirectly lower power cost. Will CSP simplify and render more transparent the 
regulatory burden of ERC? This is potentially the most promising outcome of the CSP exercise. Finally, 
since coal power enjoys a cost advantage over other fuel base and will potentially win the bids as 
they did in the private initiatives, CSP will have to square off with other DOE targets, such as the share 
of renewable. 
Will the CSP address the problem of possible transfer pricing associated with incomplete unbundling 
of utility and generation? CSP if done properly will partly remedy the problem of sweetheart deals 
where the utility pays a higher price for its PSA to proprietary GenCos which is considered competitive 
and thus unregulated. The CSP process is never perfect and auctions can be rigged. If the ERC suspects 
rigging, it can subject the PSA to a Swiss challenge which will further force market testing. Previously 
procured long term contracts will not be subject to CSP until the current contracts expire. This means 
that the reach of CSP will be limited until all previously signed contracts expire. The CSP itself will 
become less and less important as the coverage of RCOA expands and the extent of the captive 
market dwindles.    
 Finally, we feel that utmost premium be granted to the the simplest architecture for CSP 
respecting the “freedom to contract” of the market economy. Building a bureaucracy behind CSP, a 
policy that is intendedly transitory and will become a burden when the retail competition is 
completed is unwise. The simplest modality is already embodied in Resolution 13 of ERC. 
Part II  
The Evolution of the CSP Policy 
 As early as 2013, the ERC, following proper consultations, had prepared a resolution 
mandating CSP for PSA. Although properly grounded, the ERC being the agency with the legal 
mandate to issue such rules, this resolution remained unsigned, and likely, sidelined in deference to 
the initiatives along similar lines of the DOE. In February 2014, the DOE issued a draft circular entitled: 
“Adoption of Demand Aggregation and Supply Auctioning Policy in the Electric Power Industry” 
(DASAP for short) for the purpose of consultation with stakeholders. In the middle of 2015, DOE 
issued the  Department of Energy Circular 2015-06-0008 (DC 06-0008) which mandated three items: 
(i) the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) for all uncontracted demand (those not yet covered by 
long-term contracts) of all distribution utilities (DUs); (ii) the aggregation of the demand of small DUs 
into bid-attractive volumes in the run-up to the CSP; and (iii) a single transactions manager to oversee 
and implement all the auctions and the employment of a uniform power supply contract. As noted 
above, CSP is the label used for the market testing of power supply agreements (PSA) of distribution 
utilities. To many observers, DC 06-0008 came out of the blue. Consultations prior to its issuance 
were for previous DOE draft circular “DASAP”, which mandated only the aggregation of uncontracted 
demand for small DUs in the preparation for auctioning. The apparent failure to conduct proper 
consultation was only one of possibly several identified legal frailties of DC 06-0008. Item (iii), the 
single transactions manager for all auctions and the possible use of a single contract, ran into heavy 
headwind during the post-issue consultations. Another frailty: since the power to enforce a CSP 
resides only with the ERC, the DC 06-0008 seemed to overstep DOE’s mandate. CSP was clearly the 
jewel in the crown while the other two items were just ancillary to CSP but hardly necessary. CSP was, 
in addition, the most in keeping with the pro-market leaning of the legal cover, the EPIRA Law, of the 
whole exercise. It was felt that the bundling of ancillary policies with end product threatened the CSP 
itself.  
 All these abstruse and expertise-intensive issues had to be resolved by 27 October 2015, 
when the IRR was mandated to be issued! To top it all, the position of Secretary of the DOE vacated 
by its holder, who was running for an elective position, had yet to be filled. Quandary among industry 
stakeholders was the order of the day in the run-up to 27 October: hurry the IRR and a regulatory 
snarl could emerge to include possible lawsuits; delay it and the DOE may be in violation of the 120-
day stricture for the issuance of the IRRs. The baby was in danger of being thrown out with the 
bathwater! 
 Fortunately for the nation, a happy way out was found. It came in the form of Joint Resolution 
1 dated 20 October 2015, by the DOE and the ERC. Joint Resolution 1 effectively turned over the 
responsibility of CSP to ERC, which put finis to the legal issue of enforcement. Heretofore, ERC will 
issue the appropriate regulations to implement CSP! Effectively averted was a possible regulatory 
limbo. The ERC then issued Resolution No. 13 series of 2015 which mandated that, “Pending the 
issuance by the ERC of a prescribed CSP, a DU may adopt any accepted form of CSP.” Thus, CSP—the 
jewel in the crown, finally decoupled from ancillary instruments—can now proceed. Most 
importantly, it is for now the DU’s responsibility to prove to ERC that the CSP employed for its PSA is 
transparent and competitive! In the event that a PSA submission is made without a proper CSP, the 
ERC can, as part of the evaluation process, subject the PSA to a Swiss challenge. This is a kind of 
outsourcing where government’s limited capacity is resolved by bringing the market to bear. Truly 
the Joint Resolution 1 and the ERC Resolution 13 together constitute two steps forward to DC 06-
0008’s one step back  
 These two steps forward after one step back was in keeping with the simplicity rule that in 
addressing a market failure, the authorities should choose the simplest, fewest-layered, modality 
towards a resolution and avoid the more complicated alternatives. The latter, in view of severely 
limited government capacity, mostly end up as government or state failures which cost the nation 
plenty. Resolution 13 of the ERC means CSP is now operational! A prudent policy is for ERC to give 
Resolution 13 time to show its mettle since it may happen that Resolution 13 does not need any more 
additional tweaking. Only when it is clearly shown to need tweaking should tweaking be adopted. 
This is in keeping with the efficiency idea that, in weak states, intervention to perfect the market 
should be as simple as possible and complicating features added only as incontrovertible evidence 
shows how these are needed.   
 A truly welcome relief though it was, it was more or less just a return to the unsigned 2013 
ERC resolution mandating CSP. Thus, after all the costly delay and confusions of the past two years, 
the operational CSP is now back where ERC left off in 2013.         
 The said Joint Resolution 1 was signed by ERC Chairperson Jose Salazar and the newly-
installed DOE Secretary Zenaida Monsada. The latter finally accepted the standing offer to serve as 
DOE secretary despite her likely shortened tenure. Her acceptance and willingness to work with ERC 
averted a looming regulatory firestorm. None of them was a politician eyeing to make a splash for 
the next election. Coordination by the two agencies rather than ownership by one agency ruled the 
day. Perhaps there already is a lesson there—politicians on average do not make good policymakers.  
 There is another lesson to be learned here. Governments, however well-meaning, many times 
embrace sensible ideas like CSP only to despoil them with over-ambition and overreach. Government 
policymakers, following logics other than economic efficiency and common sense, tend to go for too 
big a bite even if followed by a harvest of massive social indigestion. Friedrich Hayek (1991), 1974 
Economics Nobel Memorial Prize winner, called this tendency among state policy makers a “fatal 
conceit”—the inability of state actors to recognize their own limits to improve on markets. “Hubris” 
is its name in popular parlance. Surely, most markets are imperfect; but perfecting these markets 
calls most times for “policy nudges”, not for a radical lobotomy which kills rather than heals. In the 
case of CSP, DC 06-0008 was a threatened lobotomy. In this rare instance, DOE and ERC hammered 
out an exception to the Hayek fatal conceit. Would that exceptions like this become the rule in the 
future. No guarantees but we are given a fillip for hope. 
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